From May of 1955, Canada and the Federal Republic of Germany became partners in a common military and political Alliance. At first glance, many analysts might well regard this bilateral relationship as largely unimportant, if not for Canada, then at least for the Federal Republic and certainly in most senses for NATO as a whole. However, certain factors combined significantly to enhance the importance of this bilateral relationship.
First, throughout the post-World War II era, the North American commitment was central for European and most especially German security. Due to the perception of a certain strategic unity of North America, Canada's position as the second North American member state within the Alliance became important particularly in a derivative sense. Canadian policy came to be seen in many European circles as at least providing an indication of broader policy trends present in North America as a whole. In this sense, the interest of all Europeans, Germans in particular, in Canada rose considerably over what it might otherwise have been.
Second, the Canadian-German bilateral relationship had been greatly furthered through the presence of Canadian military forces in Europe. This presence (involving an Army Brigade of 5,500 men in the Federal Republic and an Air Force Division in France and Germany equiped with some 272 operational jet fighters) gave the country a direct political stake in events in Central Europe. It also provided Canadian diplomatic initiatives or positions a greater credibility. Given Canada's active diplomatic interest in all aspects of the Alliance's strategy and politics, the potential for Canadian influence was significantly enhanced. This influence, especially in the 1950s was perceived to be particularly strong among the Alliance's smaller states and even more importantly with the two other AngloSaxon powers in the Alliance with which Canada was recognized as having a particularly close relationship.
As a result of these factors, it is not surprising that in the crisis years of 1958-61 when the Alliance was wrestling with both new challenges from the Soviet Union especially in Berlin, and also with intra-NATO disputes over Allied political policy, that Germany's interest in the evolution of Canadian policy also expanded. In fact, policy differences which emerged in this period resulted in a significant downturn in relations between the two countries. In this paper, I will endeavor to examine and outline the policy conflicts which occurred in this period. These were linked closely to the Anglo-German crisis in relations which occurred in the same period and with the fact that Canada shared many of the British government's own reservations about the direction of German policy made this crisis much more significant for the Alliance as a whole. The extent to which the events of the 1950s contributed toward the eventual emergence of a more flexible German eastern policy and the move of the Alliance as a whole to a policy of detente will be examined in the conclusion.
The Setting: Intra-Alliance and East-West Relations in the Mid-Late 1950s
The last half of the 1950s was a time of transition and change in East-West relations. The vulnerability of Soviet hegemony over eastern Europe had been demonstrated both in Poland and Hungary during 1956 and the new Soviet leadership under Nikita Khrushchev seemed intent on consolidating a more secure Soviet position in eastern Europe and achieving Western recognition and acceptance of Soviet dominance there. This manifested itself most directly in the Soviet bloc arms control proposals of 1957 and 1958 and more ominously in the ongoing pressure which the Russians began to place on the Allied position in Berlin from 1958. In the West there was some degree of uncertainty as to how to formulate a collective policy approach which would address both these political challenges and construct a viable long term policy approach that would stabilize the political and military climate in Central Europe.
The questions of military disengagement on the one hand and Berlin on the other were both key to Germany. In the German perception of the day, both issues stood at the heart of the Federal Republic's security framework. Since 1949, the Adenauer government had formulated a security policy approach which had sought to integrate Germany closely with the West. This integration was to be more than simply military and economic; it was in fact a much deeper political and philosophical reorientation of the German focus toward the West. Simultaneously however, no German government could afford to turn its back on the issue of reunification and on the symbolic emphasis which had been attached to the concept of a reunited Germany, which would include Berlin. Thus German policy required a delicate balancing act -an ever closer integration of Germany in the Western framework coupled with continued emphasis on the goal of reunification and Western support for that concept.
Germany's policy was therefore a firm one which emphasized patience over compromise on questions related to the military and political issues which divided East and West. For Bonn, ideas for military disengagement in Central Europe (which might include either limited forces zones or nuclear weapons free zones) were rejected as likely either to perpetuate the political status-quo in Europe or make the Alliance and Germany more vulnerable to Soviet conventional military superiority. On this basis, the Germans were anxious to ensure that the Alliance moved to adopt a military strategy based on »Forward Defence« in Central Europe so as to ensure the defence of the Federal Republic as close to its eastern border as possible.
With respect to the question of Berlin, the German government saw it as essential that no compromise was made to the Allied position that Berlin was an integral part of Germany. The physical Allied presence in Berlin was perceived as essential to this end and any hint of compromise in response to Soviet demands would, in Bonn's eyes, only illicit more blackmail. However, while the policy of the Federal Republic was unwavering, the attitudes of some other Allied states began from the mid 1950s onward to show increasing discomfort with a continued hardline approach.
Within the United Kingdom, for instance, there existed considerable doubt and some trepidation over aspects of Alliance policy in Central Europe. In particular, the British were concerned with the intensity of the political and military confrontation which existed in Germany. This was driven primarily by a political perception which saw a more constructive and relaxed relationship with the Soviet Union in Central Europe as possible and desirable, and was reinforced by economic and financial considerations linked to the difficulties in maintaining a large British military presence in the Federal Republic 1 .
British interest in notions of military disengagement had been demonstrated as early as 1954 in the Eden proposals 2 . This interest was again confirmed in 1957-58 in the generally positive British response to the Soviet bloc's Rapacki proposals which sought to establish a nuclear weapons free-zone for the two Germanies, Poland and Czechoslovakia 3 . For the Adenauer government, it was however the British government's response to the Soviet ultimatum on Berlin in November of 1958 which created the greatest alarm.
The surprise visit of Prime Minister Harold Macmillan to Moscow early in 1959 and the British proposal for a Foreign Minister's conference to deal with »the problem of Germany in all its aspects« generated a strongly negative response in Germany. The Adenauer government feared that Allied unity and resolve on a firm political strategy vis-a-vis the Soviet Union in Central Europe might collapse. Then, in April of 1959 prior to the startup of the Foreign Minister's conference, when the British submitted a proposal on Berlin which called for the »internationalization« of the city, Anglo-German relations sank to a new low 4 . In particular, there was concern in Bonn that British policies might begin to have an influence on the policies of other Allied states, especially the United States. In this sense, when President Eisenhower, during his meeting with Khrushchev at Camp David in September 1959, described the situation in Berlin as »abnormal« and in need of resolution, German anxiety peaked 5 .
The Ottawa-Bonn Political Relationship: Problems and Disagreements Emerge
In the first years after the restoration of German sovereignty, and even before, the bilateral political relationship between Canada and the Federal Republic had been generally positive and problem free. Indeed, a German Foreign Office memorandum prepared on the occasion of Prime Minister John Diefenbaker's Fall 1958 state visit to Germany commented that Canada's position was viewed to be one of »growing international importance« (»wachsende internationale Bedeutung«), This was seen to be a product of the country's membership in the Commonwealth, the United Nations and NATO, as well as by virtue of its close relationship with the United States 6 . Thus, Dankwort also reported to Bonn in April of 1952 that ever since Canadian troops had been sent to Germany some six months before, an accented interest in the integration of Europe and in the »German Problem« had developed in Canadian elite circles -by which he meant the government, parliament and the media 10 .
The favourable impression of the German Mission in Ottawa was matched by a generally positive view at the highest levels in Bonn. In his letter to the Canadian Ambassador in Germany, welcoming the Canadian troop deployment, Chancellor Konrad Adenauer stated that »I consider the move of the Canadian Infantry Brigade Group as Defence troops to Germany as a sign of joint desire for peace and join in the hope of your Government that the Canadian contribution to the defence of the West will develop good relations between our two nations 11 .« The positive development of relations continued after 1955 through Canada's assistance in the rearmament of the German Air Force. Canada sold the Federal Republic 225 F-86 MK 6 fighter jets and trained many of the pilots. This sale helped contribute tota 75 % increase in the dollar value of German-Canadian trade between 1955 and 1957 12 . Likewise, the Adenauer government looked favorably on that aspect of Canadian diplomatic policy which sought to deepen and strengthen the Alliance's consultative mechanisms. Indeed in terms of cooperation in the NATO framework, a memorandum of 1958 urged that the German government's interest in a strong NATO again be confirmed to Canadian authorities along with the German government's interest in turning consultation within the Alliance into a more effective policy instrument 13 .
As a result, even as late as the Fall of 1958 when Prime Minister Diefenbaker visited the Federal Republic, Chancellor Adenauer noted publicly that there were no differences in policy between the two countries, and that in fact they shared many important policy goals 14 . Likewise, the German briefing notes prepared for the government by the Foreign Office stated that: »Innerhalb des Nordatlantikpaktes ist Kanada für uns einer der wichtigsten Bündnispart-ner, der seine wirtschaftlichen und finanziellen Mittel in vorbildlicher Weise für die gemeinsame Verteidigung verwendet. Kanada hält es für erstrebenswert, das militärische Bündnis in eine Gemeinschaft mit engeren wirtschaftlichen und politischen Bindungen umzuwandeln.
Wie die Bundesregierung so sieht auch die kanadische Regierung in der Konsultation der Mitglieder ein unentbehrliches Hilfsmittel bei der Gestaltung einer gemeinsamen westlichen Außen-und Wehrpolitik 15 .« Despite this very positive statement, problem areas had nevertheless also begun by this time to emerge. Indeed, in some ways these problems flared during Diefenbaker's visit since immediately before the trip (on November the 4th) the Soviet bloc had presented a new modified »Rapacki plan« for military disengagement in Central Europe and immediately on the conclusion of Diefenbaker's visit (November 10th), Khrushchev issued the first in a series of ultimatums on Berlin. Thus Diefenbaker's public assertion during his visit to Bonn that the modified Rapacki Plan should be »carefully examined« will have raised the concerns of his German hosts 16 . Indeed, on this issue Canada seemed to be advocating the most moderate policy within the Alliance. In this respect, only one month later an External Affairs memorandum noted that, »only Canada and Norway stood out for serious consideration of the proposals and examination of the possibility that they might be used as a basis for submitting counter proposals« 17 .
The unease felt by many Canadian officials and political leaders with aspects of NATO policy was already a fairly deep one and also predated the coming to power of the Diefenbaker Conservatives in 1957. Most particularly, there was a perception that new options had at least to be considered in East-West relations and that it might be worthwhile to This visit, the first by a Western Foreign Minister to Moscow since the start of the Cold War, had been made possible as a result of Chancellor Adenauer's trip to the USSR one month before. The purposes of the two visits were however quite different. Adenauer had sought to use his visit to open diplomatic links between the German government and the Soviet Union for the first time since 1941. He also was intent on using the visit to attempt to secure the release of German Prisoners of War still held by the USSR ten years after the end of World War II. Pearson, on the other hand, saw his journey as much more of an effort to begin to break down some of the barriers, both political and psychological, which existed between East and West and to reassure the Soviet Union of the West's purely defensive intentions. In this sense Khrushchev had reportedly agreed with Pearson's view that even if the forthcoming Geneva Foreign Minister's Conference did not achieve the desired results, it should be »only the beginning of [...] a continuous search for solutions to problems at such meetings« 18 .
Since the main »problem« in East-West relations was Germany, Bonn became exceptionally nervous when any of its Allies began to intimate that »new options« perhaps ought to be explored. Thus a German Foreign Office memorandum in December of 1955 had already noted the possible consideration which Canada was giving to new approaches to the German Question, approaches which Canada might soon present to NATO Council. It was concluded that pessimism in governing Canadian circles about future political developments in Europe had already led to a Canadian decision to emphasize the continentalist dimension in Canadian defence policy and make greater efforts to help ensure the security of the North American continent 19 . Thus, German diplomats who were responsible for analyzing North American affairs, had already for some time considered the possibility that Canadian frustration with developments in Europe might lead to a shift to a more »continentalist« orientation in Canadian foreign policy. This, in German eyes, would be a most negative development for transatlantic relations as a whole.
In fact, as the Germans suspected, the future role of Canada in Europe was a subject of debate in Canada in the mid-1950s. Faced with defence budget that was declining in real terms, the previous level of commitment made by Canada in Europe would be difficult to sustain in the light of other priorities. Prior to the election of the Diefenbaker Conservatives in the Spring of 1957, the Liberal Defence Minister, Ralph Campney, had given serious consideration to withdrawing Canadian forces from Europe. In a top secret memorandum issued in February of 1957, the Minister expressed the hope that the date of Canadian withdrawal would soon be at hand. He quoted the words of the American Secretary of State, John Foster Dulles, who had apparently recently informed the NATO Council that the Europeans »would soon have to expect to provide conventional forces on the continent alone«. The memorandum summarizing Campney's view went on to state that Canada would also soon likely be able to withdraw both its Air Division and Army Brigade. »No replacement was planned for the F-86 aircraft. Once it became obsolete there would be little point in continuing to station the Air Division in France and Germany. With the build-up of the German ground forces, the significance of the Canadian Brigade Group would be marginal... only bringing the Air Division and brigade home would involve very little saving, but disbanding them would mean a reduction in expenditures of $ 150 million annually 20 .« After the election of the Diefenbaker government, despite the decision to retain Canadian Forces in Europe, the uncertainty over the future of the Canadian role in Europe (and especially with respect to the reequipment of Canadian Forces with nuclear weapon systems as called for in NATO strategy) accelerated. This uncertainty and discomfort became increasingly manifest in Alliance circles through the course of the Diefenbaker government's tenure, especially to the Germans.
Canadian Policy -German Concerns
In the years that followed the election of the Diefenbaker government in Canada, the latent concern which already existed in Canadian diplomatic circles over the evolution of events in Central Europe, accelerated. Indeed, the growing discomfort within the Canadian government over key aspects of NATO military strategy only enhanced and reinforced Canada's own discomfort with important aspects of the Alliance's political strategy as well. Thus, although relations between Canada and Germany appeared good at the time of Prime Minister Diefenbaker's state visit, problems were brewing below the surface. In a special briefing paper prepared for the German Foreign Minister, Heinrich von Brentano, it was noted that, »Kanada nimmt -im Unterschied zu der Mehrzahl der anderen NATO-Staaten -in den Fragen der europäischen Sicherheit und Abrüstung gelegentlich eine unabhängige Position ein. Es ist aufgefallen, daß die neue konservative kanadische Regierung, während der Sitzungen von NATO-Gremien durch ihre Vertreter wiederholt die Notwendigkeit einer Verstärkung der Kontakte nach dem Osten hinwies. Hier ist insbesondere auf Erklärungen der kanadischen Vertreter bei NATO hinzuweisen, desgleichen auch auf die Ausführungen, die der kanadische Außenminister Smith auf der Kopenhagener NATO-Konferenz Anfang Mai ds. Ja. entwickelte 21 .« In particular, two points were highlighted in the memorandum as of particular concern. First, that the Canadians seemed to be suggesting, in terms of the formulation of NATO policy toward the East, that consultations should not get bogged down too much in detail but rather avoid unnecessary delays and thus retain the West's ability to act.
This was seen as running counter to German interests. For Bonn, the memorandum noted, the principle of intensified consultations had to be carefully protected since the issues involved, most particularly »reunification« and »European security«, were of vital interest to the Federal Republic. Likewise, the Canadians were arguing that the West should be prepared, where necessary, to develop new proposals for European security, including, for instance, new arms control concepts for Central Europe. counterargued that Central Europe was the last place that new arms control concepts should be tested since the region was obviously a politically highly sensitive one. Given the fact that Canada also seemed to be suggesting that a strengthening of NATO Forces should possibly not take place before a summit conference, it was advised that the Canadians be made cognizant of the fact that a failure by NATO to act on modernization would only encourage Soviet speculation that the Western position was softening. In terms of the Rapacki Plan, and the Canadian intimations that it be seriously considered, it was again emphasized that it was not in the German interest to see disarmament agreements reinforce the political status quo in Central Europe.
While it was noted that these tendencies in Canadian policy »should not be dramatized,« (»nicht dramatisiert werden«) they should, it was argued, be »attentively followed« (»aufmerksam verfolgt«). Similar tendencies, it was argued, could be detected in both Danish and especially Norwegian policy 22 . Since in other briefing notes the »strengthened proBritish course« (»verstärkt englandfreundliche Kurs«) of Diefenbaker government policy had been noted 23 , perhaps the implications of Canadian diplomatic activity in helping to encourage further undesirable initiatives from Britain and other countries, may have also contributed to the German Foreign Office's concern. In any case, it was emphasized that the forth-coming meeting with Prime Minister Diefenbaker would be a rare opportunity to exchange views at the highest level. As such, it was recommended that the memorandum on »Canada and the question of European security« prepared within the Foreign Office, also be passed on to Chancellor Adenauer 24 .
During the talks in Bonn, Canada seemed to try to go some way in alleviating German concerns. Prime Minister Diefenbaker reemphasized both to Adenauer privately and to the press publically, that Canada still placed the greatest weight on the importance of intensified consultations within the Alliance 25 . However, even as Diefenbaker prepared to leave Germany, Khrushchev's first in a series of ultimatums on Berlin was issued. This dominated the German focus from November 10th onwards, and as an offshoot of the serious tensions which the Berlin Crises of 1958 to 1961 would cause between Germany and its other Anglo-Saxon Allies, most especially Britain, these tensions would, in their own small way, affect Canadian-German relations as well.
Khrushchev's ultimatum on Berlin had an immediate effect in increasing political and diplomatic tensions between the major Allies. The British government's independent approach on the Berlin question reflected a steadily evolving British distrust of the Adenauer government's hard-line policy toward relations with the Soviet bloc. anxious to explore alternatives to the policy of firmness and patience which the Alliance had maintained since 1955. For the British government, the uncomprising policy approach of the Federal Republic (increasingly supported by France) raised the spectre of a NATO political and diplomatic policy increasingly set in Bonn and Paris and thus reflecting first and foremost the interests of Germany and France. Already concerned about the growing economic strength of the newly created European Economic Community, the British were anxious to ensure that NATO's political and diplomatic policy did not also fall under the dominant sway of the Germans and the French. Coupled with this was a real British uncertainty as to whether it was worth risking war over the issue of Berlin. In this sense, it was hoped that on the question of Berlin, and more generally on the question of the level of military forces in Central Europe, some common understanding could be found with the Soviet Union which would lead to workable agreement, reduced tensions and a lower level of confrontation in Central Europe.
Similar views existed in the Canadian External Affairs Department (DEA). In December of 1958, Canadian External Affairs Secretary Sidney Smith held a meeting in Paris with
Canadian Ambassadors in Western Europe. As Escott Reid, Canada's Ambassador in Bonn at the time records in his Memoirs, the meeting addressed the question of whether Canada should try to persuade the Federal Republic to move in the direction of revising its foreign policy on the recognition of East Germany and on the Oder-Neise line as the border between Germany and Poland. The consensus in DEA was that German policy had to move in this direction eventually; the question however was whether Canada should formally begin to lobby Germany to move toward greater flexibility immediately. While Reid did advocate that Canadian policy become more active in this respect, the former Ambassador to Bonn, Charles Ritchie and most other Canadian diplomats as well, argued that such a policy shift at this time would be counterproductive and potentially push Germany toward pursuing an even more resentful and dangerous hardline policy 26 . Beyond, sympathy for a more flexible policy on the German Question, a plan was also formulated within External Affairs for disengagement in Central Europe which was modelled on the Rapacki Plan and the earlier Eden proposals 27 .
Canada's sympathy for the British position was well-known. Indeed, the Canadian External Affairs Secretary, Sidney Smith, stated to the House of Common's External Affairs Committee in March of 1959 that the government viewed MacMillan's decision to go to Moscow as a wise one and that the exchange of views which had taken place in Moscow could be of great value for future negotiations which were regarded as absolutely necessary. Smith stated that Canada committed itself to the principle of negotiations between East and West, and urged a more positive approach be taken in the West's diplomatic initiatives and responses.
As far as Khruschchev's ultimatum and Soviet threats to block the Berlin corridor were concerned, the External Affairs Minister urged that all steps possible be taken by the Alliance to avoid a military confrontation. In contrast to the harder line positions being taken by the Germans, the Americans, and to a lesser extent the French, Smith noted that Canada would have serious reservations if it ever became necessary to take a decision to use military In terms of the evolution of Canadian policy under the guidance of Howard Green, the German Embassy warned in September of 1959 that the new Minister had absolutely no foreign policy experience. In fact, it was noted that he had barely ever left the country since being overseas in the First World War. As such, it could be expected that his foreign policy opinions might well be framed through his strong pro-British sentiment. The Embassy thus suggested Green be invited to the Federal Republic as soon as possible so as to give him a personal impression of Germany and of German policy. In this vein, it was suggested that Bonn would have its work cut out for it, since it was noted that in a meeting between Ambassador Siegfried and Green earlier in September the Ambassador had been forced to correct Green's mistaken view that the Federal Republic was a member of the United Nations 33 ! By the late Fall of 1959, German concern with respect to the evolution of Canadian policy had become considerably stronger. Ambassador Siegfried referred to Canadian policy in strong terms, calling it in some aspects »remarkably naive«' (»merkwürdig naiv«) and heavily influenced by London 34 . »Die Hinneigung der gegenwärtigen kanadischen Regierung zu England«, he stated, »auf die ich nicht eindrücklich genug hinweisen kann, hat für uns zur Folge, daß jede Trübung -ebenso wie jede Festigung -der Beziehung zwischen Bonn und London stimmungsmäßig auch Rückwirkungen in Ottawa hat. Es wäre gut, wenn die Botschaft diese Beziehungen, wie ich es ohne Sprachregelung wiederholt getan habe, im kanadischen Außenministerium manchmal mit formulierten Argumenten unter deutschem Gesichtswinkel kommentieren könnte, um einer einseitigen Orientierung aus London entgegenzuwirken.« »Ich würde daher dankbar sein,« Siegfried concluded,« wenn der Botschaft auch Berichte der Botschaft in London zugänglich gemacht werden könnten, die für diesen Zweck brauchbar erscheinen« 35 . In a similar impression of Canadian policy, the German Embassy in Paris reported that, during his visit to London and Paris in early November, Mr. Green had spoken optimistically about the success likely to accrue from an East-West Summit Conference, and about the prospect for a disarmament agreement. In the French view, the Embassy reported, of all NATO States, Canada was now »promoting the softest line« (»die weichste Linie vertrete«) 36 .
This German perception of Canadian policy has to be put in the political climate of late 1959. In September, Khrushchev had met President Eisenhower at Camp David where Eisenhower had publically described the situation in Berlin as »abnormal.« Both leaders had agreed that negotiations on Berlin should be reopened »with a view to achieving a solution which would be in accordance with the interests of all concerned and in the interest of the maintenance of peace« 37 . The Germans at this time became most fearful of the direction that American policy was beginning to move and of the influence that the British, and other NATO States who took a similar line might be having on American policy.
On November 19, Dr. Hasso von Etzdorf, who had been German Ambassador in Ottawa from 1956 to 1958 and thereafter on his return to Bonn became head of the division in the German Foreign Office responsible for NATO, the Commonwealth and the Americas, wrote to Ambassador Siegfried confirming the growing anxiety in Bonn over the direction of Canadian policy. He noted that German Defence Minister Franz-Josef Strauß, after his return from a recent visit to Canada to discuss armament's cooperation, had himself commented with some alarm on the political positions being taken by Canadian decision-makers on the issue of Berlin and on the German Question in general. Likewise, the French view of Canadian policy, as reported by the German Embassy there, was quoted to the Ambassador in Ottawa. In general, von Etzdorf noted that the shift in Canadian foreign and defence policy that occurred in recent years had indicated that Canada could no longer be referred to, the way it had been in the past, as a country which always fulfilled its Alliance duties 38 . The fact that the German Foreign Office was willing to equate the Canadian approach on East-West questions and on Berlin with a poor fulfilment of its Alliance duties reflected the growing anxiety in German decision-making circles over the whole collective Allied approach to the Berlin question. Indeed, von Etzdorf informed Siegfried that so intense was the German concern over developments in Canadian policy that reports from the Embassy in Ottawa were regularly being forwarded to Foreign Minister von Brentano and also on occasion to the Chancellor as well.
Von Etzdorf acknowledged that Bonn desired more detailed reports from Ottawa on what the Germans could likely expect from Canadian policy. These reports would be more valuable if, von Etzdorf argued, they were placed in the context of what he perceived was a retreat from the positive internationalism of the Pearson years under the Diefenbaker government. It was feared that the Canadian economy might no longer be able to sustain its past level of internationalist engagement. In this sense, von Etzdorf suggested that the Pearson years might well have been an abberation in Canadian foreign policy and that Canada's present hesitancy in sustaining its previously unreserved support for both the Alliance's political and military policy in Europe might now represent a policy increasingly influenced by »isolationist tendencies« (»isolationistisch gefärbten Tendenzen«). In any case, von Etzdorf confirmed, that the Germans would seek to use the coming December NATO Meeting to arrange a meeting between Green and von Brentano and issue an open invitation for Green to visit the Federal Republic 39 .
German Policy -Canadian Concerns
While Bonn may have perceived Canadian policy as principally the product of a new government leadership which was idealistically naive, reactively pro-British, instinctively more isolationist, or all three, it seems nevertheless as far as Canada's political policy on disengagement and on Berlin was concerned, the government by and large had relatively enthusiastic support of Canadian diplomats. By all indications, both Canadian government and diplomatic circles had by 1959 come to regard German policy, and particularly Chancellor Adenauer's style of leadership and policy implementation as counterproductive to the collective interests of the Alliance in Europe and certainly to the goal of constructive negotiations with the Soviet bloc.
In September of 1957, when Adenauer's CDU/CSU coalition had been re-elected for the third consecutive time, this time with an absolute majority, the then Canadian Ambassador, Charles Ritchie, had reported that most observers in West Germany had reacted with »satisfaction and even relief« 40 . The more nationalist SPD had long been the object of suspicion in the West, but by the mid 1950's this was already beginning to change. Indeed, in 1956 Ritchie's successor as Ambassador, Escott Reid, viewed the SPD even more positively and was particularly impressed with the SPD Mayor of Berlin, Willy Brandt, believing he would in the future be the SPD's candidate for Chancellor. Reid later recollected, that by 1959 he had become convinced that a new arrangement for Berlin was essential and he put his views to Ottawa on this subject in 1959 as well as in later years during his tenure in Bonn. Although Reid admitted that his stance was »radical« and opposed by many of his own Embassy officials, it is also clear that the general orientation of Canadian policy was strongly desirous of a more flexible Allied and German policy in Central Europe 42 . In the months and years after 1957, a more flexible German foreign policy became increasingly wished for and the perception of the SPD as a viable and preferred alternative to an Adenauer-led government even strengthened.
By 1959, Canadian opinion with respect to Chancellor Adenauer had in fact reached its lowest point. Canadian diplomats had viewed in a generally positive light and had supported the British initiatives toward the Soviet Union earlier in 1959. The negative reaction of Bonn, and especially the Chancellor, to these initiatives, and in particular the personal attacks on MacMillan himself, had surprised and angered both British and Canadian diplomats. In June of 1959, Reid had met with the British Foreign Secretary, Selwyn Lloyd, in Geneva, who related his view of how the Germans had unjustifiably held the British publically responsible for the decision not to go ahead with the holding of the federal German presidential elections in Berlin. Lloyd argued it had in fact been von Brentano who had first suggested that the elections not be held 43 . Regular British briefings for Canadian diplomats of the High Commission in London also reinforced the perception that the Germans were engaged in an anti-British smear campaign.
However it was Adenauer's decision to remain Chancellor rather than to assume the office of Federal President, as he had earlier announced his intention to do, which especially sparked a vehement series of personal attacks on the German Chancellor in Canadian diplomatic communications. In reporting to Ottawa, Escott Reid reported that Adenauer's love of power had become an »obsession.« His decisions, Reid argued, basing his assessments on private conversations with German officials in the Foreign Office, »depend on whether he is having a good day or a bad day.« Reid went further, »Adenauer's behavior in the last four months has greatly dimmed his great reputation. Nothing so little becomes him as this kind of last chapter to his political career. Reports from Ambassador Reid in Bonn also indicated that the German Foreign Office was not entirely happy with the Chancellor's handling of foreign policy, not insofar as its content was concerned, but with regard to its implementation. In January, 1959, von Etzdorf had informed Reid that relations between the Foreign Office and the Chancellor's Office were extremely bad and that Adenauer was making decisions without consulting the Foreign Office 46 . Reid's information was provided through personal discussions with both Hasso von Etzdorf and George Duckwitz, a senior German Foreign Office official who later became State Secretary in the Foreign Office under Willy Brandt 47 . Reid was thus given fairly regular information on the state of Anglo-German relations as these steadily deteriorated. Indeed, in July von Etzdorf pronounced these relations as at their worst since the war 48 .
The willingness of senior German officials, like von Etzdorf and Duckwitz, to provide Reid with privileged information on the inner workings of German foreign policy establishment, and their apparent need to, on occasion, reveal their own and the Foreign Office's embarrassment over some of Chancellor Adenauer's actions may well have had an additional strategic motivation. Von Etzdorf and Duckwitz were certainly aware of the close contacts which existed between British and Canadian diplomats, and by distancing the German Foreign Office from the personal attacks then being mounted on the British Prime Minister by the Chancellor, they may have been seeking to indicate that some aspects of German foreign policy were not widely supported in the German foreign policy bureaucracy. In July, 1959, for instance, von Etzdorf informed Reid on at least two occasions that efforts were being made to get the Chancellor to take some public steps to improve Anglo-German relations.
After the collapse of the Paris Summit in May of 1960 due to the famed U-2 incident, diplomacy on Berlin faded into the background for a short period. Then with the construction of the Berlin Wall one year later, a new emphasis was placed on Allied unity especially with respect to the Alliance's policy on the questions of Berlin and disengagement. In this respect, the increasingly uncertain and disruptive policy of the Diefenbaker government in 1961-63 with regard to the reequipment of Canadian forces in Central Europe with nuclear weapons became an irritant for both NATO and German officials.
Although the Diefenbaker government had originally moved to reequip Canadian Forces in Europe with weapon systems (such as Honest John rockets for the Army Brigade and the CF-104 Starfighter for the Air Division) designed to carry nuclear weapons, the government then began to balk at actually acquiring the warheads which would make these systems effective. This issue eventually paralyzed the government to such an extent that by 1963 both the CF-104 and the Honest John were in service in Europe but without the warheads to make them operational. In fact, the CF-104, which had not been envisaged to carry out any conventional role, was flying in Canadian service completely unarmed. Ultimately, the Conservative Defence Minister, Douglas Harkness, resigned over the issue and the Diefenbaker government was defeated in the House of Commons in a motion of nonconfidence. The Liberal party, led by Lester Pearson, which won the subsequent 1963 election (the only election in Canadian peacetime history to focus on issues related primarily to national defence) quickly recognized that in order to have any influence at all within the Alliance, both Canada's political as well as its military policy would have to be moved back into the Alliance mainstream. Thus, Canada moved both to reequip its forces with nuclear weapons (as called for in NATO strategy) while simultaneously using its diplomatic influence, quietly and behind the scenes, to work toward a political consensus within the Alliance which would support a more relaxed relationship with the Soviet bloc.
A similar recognition on the need for a more flexible policy approach also began to gain support in the Federal Republic during the same period with respect to aspects of Germany's eastern policy. Indeed, even before the retirement of Chancellor Adenauer in November of 1963, Bonn had begun to formulate a more flexible policy toward the eastern bloc. In the years after 1963 these moves toward a more flexible policy would accelerate and eventually be central in paving the way toward a more relaxed and regulated relationship between the Western and Eastern blocs in Europe.
Conclusions
In many respects, the crisis of relations which occurred between Britain and Germany and between Canada and the Federal Republic in the latter 1950s, was a product of the adjustments which were required after 1955 to accommodate Germany's particular political and strategic interests in the Alliance setting. These differences were real and significant ones which in the context of Soviet policies of threat and intimidation constituted a significant danger for the Alliance's continued cohesion and unity. Despite the increasing element of personal animosity between British and German leaders in the period, differences did extend beyond particular personality differences. The same was true of German-Canadian relations as well, even if to a much lesser degree of intensity and overall importance. In the Canadian case, differences with German policy also reflected, as von Etzdorf had correctly argued in his letter to Ambassador Siegfried in November of 1959, an unresolved uncertainty in Canadian foreign and defence policy. No longer able for economic and political reasons to play the role she had in the immediate post-war period, Canadian leaders were uncertain about the direction in which to take the country's foreign and defence policy. In particular, there was now a growing hesitancy about continuing with unquestioning support of Alliance military and political policies which seemed to be unreflective of the Canadian desire for a more flexible policy approach toward the Soviet bloc. The German perception that Canadian hesitancy might be indicative of neo-isolationism in Canadian policy demonstrated what the Germans felt would be the most serious consequence of a continuation of such a Canadian policy trend.
Ultimately German leaders, German diplomats and the public in Germany as well came to recognize the need to adjust German policy objectives and not only acquiesce but in fact lead the search for a new and more stable relationship with the Eastern bloc. By leading this process, the Federal Republic ensured that German interests remained protected and
